See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 29 (1985): “It is very clear that the founders shared Locke’s and Blackstone’s affection for private property, which is why they inserted the eminent domain provision in the Bill of Rights.”
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 75 (Cox ed., 1982).
From an essay entitled “Property” published March 27, 1792, National Gazette; reprinted in James Madison, 14 The Papers of James Madison 266 (Rutland, et al. eds, 1983).
Id.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1896). The Bill of Rights was originally intended to apply only to federal actions, but the merits of the incorporation doctrine need not be addressed here.
See, e.g. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432, 434-435 (1982). See also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). This is primarily due to the fact that, prior to Mahon, the impacts of governmental actions on private property were minimal. The government was only beginning to “find” constitutional authority for regulatory powers.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
433 Mich. 57, 68-73, 445 N.W.2d 61, 65-68 (1989).
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).
183 Mich.App. 565, 455 N.W.2d 378 (1990).
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Co., 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
482 U.S. at 321.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987), citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
The owner may be able to pursue a substantive due process claim which does not require that all use be denied, but substantive due process is beyond the scope of this study.
Bond v. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 183 Mich.App. 225, 454 N.W. 2d 395 (1989).
Carabell v. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 191 Mich.App. 610, 612, 478 N.W.2d 675, 676 (1991); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
438 Mich. 385, 475 N.W.2d 37 (1991).
438 Mich. at 387, 475 N.W.2d at 39.
438 Mich. at 390, 475 N.W.2d at 40, citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415.
438 Mich. at 403, 475 N.W.2d at 46, citing Kirk v. Tyrone Twp., 398 Mich 429, 444, 247 N.W.2d 848 (1976).
Id.
438 Mich. at 400, 475 N.W.2d at 45.
171 Mich.App. 526, 431 N.W.2d 53 (1988).
171 Mich.App. at 535, 431 N.W.2d at 58, citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
Id., citing Bott v. Natural Resources Comm., 415 Mich 45, 81, n43, 327 N.W.2d 838 (1982) and Pearsall v. Eaton Co. Supervisors, 74 Mich 558, 561, 42 N.W. 77 (1889).
183 Mich.App. 225, 231, 454 N.W.2d 395, 398 (1989).
183 Mich.App. at 231, 454 N.W.2d at 398 (1989).
191 Mich.App. 610, 612, 478 N.W.2d 675, 676 (1991).
Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 601-602 (2nd ed., 1871).
Cooley at 584-5.
438 U.S. 104, 130-131 (1978).
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979).
480 U.S. 470 (1987). See e.g. also Jentgen v. U.S., 657 F 2d 1210 (Ct Cl, 1981), cert den 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (where plaintiff owned 100 acres, 60 of which could not be developed due to wetlands regulations and the court of claims considered the 100 acres as the parcel in finding no taking); Ciampitti v. U.S., 22 Ct Cl 310 (1991) (determining the relevant parcel to be entire 45-acre parcel of wetlands and uplands, not just the 14 acres of wetland.)
480 U.S. 470, 500, “It is clear...that our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions within a bundle of property rights.”
480 U.S. 470, 497, citing Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1192 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36, 60 (1964); Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 566-567 (1984).
Bevan v. Township of Brandon, 438 Mich 385, 475 N.W.2d 37 (1991), cert den 112 S.Ct. 941 (1992). See also State Highway Commissioner v. Englebrecht, 2 Mich.App. 572, 140 N.W.2d 781 (1966); In re Dillman, 256 Mich 654, 239 N.W. 883 (1932); State Highway Commissioner v. Snell, 8 Mich.App. 299, 154 N.W.2d 631 (1967).
438 Mich 385, 393 citing 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning, §6.07(5), p. 6-45.
Id. at 395, citing Korby v. Redford Twp., 348 Mich 193, 82 N.W.2d 441 (1957).
1995 Mich. App. LEXIS 461 (No. 159820, October 20, 1995).
21 Cl Ct 153 (1990).
203 Mich.App. 674 (1994).
Id. at 680.
Volkema v. Department of Natural Resources, 1995 Mich.App. LEXIS 461 (dissent).
In re Widening of Bagley Ave., 248 Mich. 1, 5, 226 N.W. 688 (1929).
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
Michigan State Highway Commission v. Cronenwett, 52 Mich.App. 109, 144, 216 N.W.2d 597, 600 (1974), citing In re State Highway Commissioner, 249 Mich. 530, 535, 229 N.W. 500, 501 (1930).
189 Mich.App. 603, 608, 474 N.W.2d 140, 143, citing In re Grand Haven Hwy., 357 Mich. 20, 26, 97 N.W.2d 748 (1959), quoting In re Widening of Michigan Avenue, Roosevelt to Livernois, 280 Mich. 539, 548, 273 N.W. 798 (1937).
189 Mich.App. 603, 618, 474 N.W.2d 140, 147 (1991), citing 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, §12B.08[2], p. 12B-54, §12B.12, pp. 12B-90--12B-105.
Poirier v. Grand Blanc Tp., 192 Mich.App. 539, 481 N.W.2d 762 (1992).
410 Mich. 616, 645-6, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464-5 (1981).
410 Mich. 616, 630, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458 (1981).
410 Mich. at 632, 304 N.W.2d at 458. One common law exception, the instrumentality of commerce exception, does allow roads or ways by land or water to be conveyed to private parties. Commerce instrumentality conveyances are justified on grounds of extreme public necessity otherwise impracticable, continuing accountability to the public, and public choice of land; see Ryan, dissent, 410 Mich. at 674-5, 304 N.W.2d at 477-8, citing Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427, 439 (1852).
410 Mich. at 632-4, 304 N.W.2d at 458-9.
410 Mich. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
Id.
Cooley at 586-7. Cooley adds, “It may be for the public benefit that all the wild lands of the State be improved and cultivated, all the low lands drained, all the unsightly places beautified, all dilapidated building replaced by new;...but the common law has never sanctioned an appropriation of property based on these considerations alone.” Today’s interests in environmental protection to take land to preserve “wild lands” or to prevent the drainage of lowlands at the expense of development, though completely the opposite of the anticipated public interest assertions that concerned Cooley, would be no more legitimate under his analysis.
Cooley at 585-6. Cooley does argue that property may be transferred to a private entity, but limits such transfers to recognized areas of eminent domain such as the construction of public ways.
410 Mich. at 666, 304 N.W.2d at 474, citing General Development Corp. v. Detroit, 322 Mich. 495, 498, 33 N.W.2d 919 (1948); Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Dehn, 340 Mich. 25, 39-40, 64 N.W.2d 903 (1954); Cleveland v. Detroit, 322 Mich 172, 179, 33 N.W.2d 747 (1948); Board of Health of Portage Twp. v. Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 533, 539, 49 N.W. 894 (1891).
410 Mich at 681, 304 N.W.2d at 480.
442 Mich. 626, 502 N.W.2d 638 (1993).
442 Mich. at 639, 502 N.W.2d at 645.
Michigan’s first statewide property rights organization, The Rights Alliance for Michigan, formed in 1995.
114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
483 U.S. 825; 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
1995 AZ Chapter 166, 1995 AZ H.2229; 1993 Laws of Utah Chapter 269, 1995 UT H.B. 171. Oklahoma and Texas also introduced permit condition bills in 1995; 1995 OK S.B. 152, 1995 TX 74R H.B. 2481.
Twenty-six state legislatures introduced planning bills in 1995, and 16 states have enacted planning legislation since 1992. Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming have all enacted some form of planning legislation.
23 states introduced compensation reform legislation in 1995.
Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, FL Chapter 95-181, 1995 FL H.B. 863;. The Washington state legislature also passed a compensation law with no trigger point, however, it failed when enough signatures were gathered to force a referendum on the issue and was subsequently defeated by the voters in November of 1995; The Private Property Regulatory Fairness Act, 1995 WA C.A. 164. North Carolina’s state legislature also introduced a compensation bill with no trigger point in 1995; 1995 NC H.B. 597.
Governmental Action Affecting Private Property Rights, TX Government Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Chapter 2007; 1995 TX 74R S.B. 14.
Mississippi Agricultural and Forestry Activity Act, 1995 MS H. 1541.
Right to Farm and Forest, LA Title 3, Chapter 22; 1995 LA H.B. 2199.
Many state constitutions include the word “damaged” or some equivalent thereof in their takings clauses. See William B. Stoebuck, “Nontrespassory Takings” in Eminent Domain 5 (1977).
1995 FL S.J.R. 968; 1995 FL H.J.R. 1847.
The Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, FL Chapter Law 95-181; 1995 FL H.B. 863.
The following enacted or proposed bills provide particularly valuable guidance, in whole or in part, to those drafting legislation for Michigan: Texas (Government Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Chapter2007; 1995 TX 74R S.B. 14); Florida (Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, 1995 FL H.B. 863); Washington (Private Property Regulatory Fairness Act, Initiative 164; Referendum 48); Louisiana (Title 3, Chapter 22; 1995 LA H.B. 2199); North Dakota (1995 ND S.B. 2388); New York (1995 NY A.B. 5820).
See Appendix B, Section 3 (a) and (b).
See Alan v. Wayne Co., 388 Mich. 210, 200 N.W.2d 628 (1972).
See Appendix B, Sections 4 and 6.
See Appendix B, Section 3 (d).
See Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 579 (1995).
See Appendix B, Section 5.
See Appendix B, Section 8. See also Jack Loeks Theatres, Inc. v. City of Kentwood, 189 Mich.App. 603, 617: “Just as a property owner in a properly initiated and prosecuted condemnation action is entitled to, pursuant to statute, a reasonable attorney fee...a property owner forced to pursue an inverse condemnation action should be entitled to the same attorney fees as part of its ‘just compensation’ pursuant to our state constitution.”
See Appendix B, Section 7.
See Appendix B, Sections 11-14.
Executive Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859; 24 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 347 (1988).
See generally Roger J. Marzulla, The New “Takings” Executive Order and Environmental Regulation--Collision or Cooperation?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,254 (July 1988); Nancie G. Marzulla, State Property Rights Initiatives, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 613, 628 (Summer 1995).
EPA Measure Faces Hit on “Takings,” Nat’l J.’s Congress Daily/A.M., Apr. 26, 1993, at 1.
See Appendix A, Sections 1 and 2.
Epstein at 329.
James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, at 349 (Cooke ed., 1961).
Property Rights Done Wrong, The Detroit News, October 27, 1995.
The Supreme Court has stated: “Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without lawful deprivation...is in truth a “personal” right...In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized.” Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
From an essay entitled “Property” published March 27, 1792, National Gazette; reprinted in James Madison, 14 The Papers of James Madison 266 (Rutland, et al. eds, 1983).