Two laws grant state departments unilateral power in case of so-called imminent dangers. These statutes are related, as they use similar language to define imminent dangers and provide similar authority to MIOSHA and the state health department.
The definition of an “imminent danger” in both statutes is broad. The Public Health Code says it occurs when “a condition or practice exists that could reasonably be expected to cause death, disease, or serious physical harm immediately or before the imminence of the danger can be eliminated through enforcement procedures otherwise provided.”[82] Terms such as “reasonably be expected” and “serious physical harm” are too subjective to offer much guidance about when this power may be triggered. The definition in the MIOSHA-related law is no better: It uses similar language and differs only in specifically referring to imminent dangers in workplaces.[83]
Despite this imprecise trigger, both statutes imply that an imminent danger is a localized event, affecting, at most, one area and a small group of people. For example, the director of the state health department is required to “inform the individuals affected by the imminent danger” and “issue an order … to a person authorized to avoid, correct, or remove the imminent danger.”[84] Similarly, MIOSHA’s imminent danger orders concern an individual business and its employees.[85] In fact, the MIOSHA statute envisions only select areas of a workplace being at risk; it requires the health department to “apply a tag to the equipment or process that is the source of the imminent danger.”[86]
Both MIOSHA and the health department may order individuals to address an imminent danger and prohibit them from entering locations where the danger exists.[87] Interestingly, neither statute appears to grant the departments the ability to enforce these unilateral orders. If a person or employer does not comply, the departments must get a circuit court to order them to do so, according to the statutes.[88]
This procedural safeguard constrains the unilateral element of these emergency powers. But the statutes’ broad definitions of “imminent dangers” mean they could, nevertheless, have a far-reaching impact. There is also no durational limit to these emergency orders articulated in either law.