As explained above, HJR H would create three classes of property, each with a different combination of assessment method and millage rates. Such a system is bound to produce large disparities in the taxation of similar properties. Could such a system pass muster under the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the laws?
While the U.S. Supreme Court recently decided that an acquisition-value assessment method does not, by itself, deprive citizens of equal protection, HJR H goes far beyond the disparities caused by such a method alone. Its mix of assessment methods, and the explicit levy of different tax rates on neighboring property, would create a bizarre mixture of higher and lower taxes, with little apparent rational basis. This is especially likely if the implementing legislation leaves the many avenues for disparate tax treatment open.
For these reasons, explained at length in Appendix I, HJR H would be subject to a strong challenge in Federal Court. In our opinion, the disparities caused by HJR H do not serve a clear rational purpose, and it may ultimately be declared unconstitutional should it pass this November.