We have already discussed the problems in risk prediction, allocation, and control created by implied warranties, particularly where the "implied warranty" runs directly counter to an express warranty, as in Henningsen v. Boomfield Motors.

The primary argument against strong warranties has been that they are merely an escape from liability that powerful merchants and manufacturers force onto powerless consumers. Those whose view of society centers around the individual tend to reject this idea, believing that consumers are capable of making informed, intelligent decisions. However, even those who accept the coercive view of consumer-business relationships should tend to agree that, when possible, voluntary agreements are preferable to settling disputes in court, particularly when the rush to court has created the existing tort and liability insurance morass. And this paper has not even considered the enormous administrative burden of the present system, now accounting for roughly half of all tort costs, or some $20 billion per year. [85]

Modern contract laws emphasizing full disclosure and warnings have softened the "buyer beware" doctrines of 19th century jurisprudence. Allocation of risks by agreement among the parties before an accident is consistent with notions of individual rights and responsibilities, with the proper functioning of liability insurance markets, and with prompt compensation for deserving recipients.