(Note: part four of six.)
If an example is needed to
show why interest arbitration — a main component in the Employee Free Choice Act
now before Congress — is a bad idea, look no further than what occurred in
Detroit in the late 1970s.
In the fall of 1978, the
city of Detroit was beginning to turn a corner. Crime rates were dropping — they
had plummeted 19 percent in 1977 alone — and as The Detroit News observed,
"People are beginning to return to the downtown, spurred by the Renaissance
Center and a reduction in crime … people are beginning to lose their wariness
about venturing into the city."
The city’s finances were
very tight, but the budget was balanced, and Mayor Coleman Young had negotiated
a lean master contract with the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees which represented the vast majority of city employees. The
city still had to settle on contracts with the police and fire unions, but if
Young could get similar terms there, the city had a chance to hold on long
enough for new businesses to take root and grow.
The city held firm in
negotiations with the police officers and firefighters. The final offers from
the police and firemen unions were only a bit higher than the city’s on base
pay, but the unions demanded a generous cost-of-living allowance, quite an
expensive perk in those days of high inflation. Unable to reach an agreement,
the city and the unions went into arbitration, as required by Public Act 312.
This law stipulates that public safety employees may not strike, and must accept
binding arbitration when a municipality and their union reach a bargaining
impasse.
The arbitration for the
police officers went first, and the panel that would set the firefighters’
contract was expected to follow suit. The union and city delegates, as expected,
each held out for their own sides’ positions. Then, arbitration board Chairman
Robert Howlett, a former chairman of the Michigan Employment Relations
Commission who had the deciding vote, came down on the side of the police union.
The city responded by allowing attrition to remove 350 officers and cutting
2,300 employees from other departments. The city then hoped the courts would set
the arbitrators’ ruling aside.
When the courts refused to
intervene, Young eventually resorted to large-scale layoffs of police officers.
In the two years after the first arbitrators’ rulings, the Detroit police force
dropped from 5,400 officers to fewer than 4,000. Crime rates, which had been
declining as late as the end of 1979, jumped 15.2 percent in 1980 as fewer
officers were available to answer calls for assistance. A fragile "Renaissance"
failed. In 1981, the union agreed to a three-year wage freeze.
To be fair, a lot of things
went wrong in Detroit other than binding arbitration, but Detroit does serve to
illustrate the sorts of risks involved. Interest arbitration allows arbitrators
to decide binding contracts based on their own opinions of what is prudent and
fair, as opposed to having employers and unions work out those contracts on
their own. An overly generous award can have broad-reaching effects, and
eventually backfire on those same workers it was intended to benefit — even
those who manage to avoid being laid off.
Binding arbitration has
proved very useful for settling disputes that might arise when there already is
a contract in place, but outside of government there has been little
interest in using third-party binding arbitration to settle the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement when negotiations break down. Some airlines have
taken this route in the past, but otherwise workers and employers in the private
sector have made little use of interest arbitration.
Under the Employee Free
Choice Act, employers would be forced to recognize a union after the union
collects a majority of employee signatures, a process known as "card check" that
leaves workers vulnerable to harassment by union organizers. As was pointed out
in
part two, card check removes the privacy of a secret-ballot election. With
card check, everyone knows who signed and who didn’t. That same legislation goes
on to state that if negotiations on an initial contract (the first after a union
is recognized) break down both workers and management must accept the decision
of an arbitrator on their wages and working conditions. This would especially be
harmful to those employees who did not want the union in the first place.
This procedure has a poor
record in Michigan, where it has been legally mandated for nearly 40 years to
resolve labor disputes involving police officers and firefighters. The process
has proved to be cumbersome, with drawn-out arbitrations leading to large back
pay awards for workers who are forced to wait for months or years to receive pay
increases.
As damaging as an
ill-advised arbitrator’s decision might be for a local government, there are
several reasons to believe that the risk would be even greater in the private
sector:
Unlike the typical arbitrator’s decision
in government, the EFCA would apply only to the initial negotiations after a
union is recognized. This means that the arbitrator would not be able to look to prior collective bargaining agreements for guidance.
A conscientious arbitrator is more
likely to base his or her decision on the practices of comparable companies, but this has drawbacks, too. A company with its own distinctive business model could be forced to adopt the practices of its competitors, while still using a
workforce that was structured for its original, unique approach. Likewise,
employees may be obligated to adopt work practices with which they are not
familiar. Either way, the company and its employees may find that a competitive
advantage is suddenly turned into a disadvantage.
If the arbitration process turns out to
be a slow one, as it often is in Michigan government, business owners will be
forced to prepare for retroactive back-pay awards while they wait for overdue
decisions. This ties up funds that cannot be used to invest in new equipment,
nor can these funds be offered as incentives to lure new workers because
back-pay awards go exclusively to the existing workforce.
Unlike a local government, a business
cannot raise taxes or turn to a higher level of government for financial
assistance if an arbitrator’s decision goes against them. Competition in the
free market means that if an arbitrator miscalculates and raises wages too high, companies cannot raise their prices to compensate for the decision without the risk of losing customers. These factors only increase the chances that an ill-advised arbitrator’s ruling will lead to financial difficulty and layoffs.
For these reasons, it’s
clear that in the private sector either business owners or unions — or both —
have little confidence in interest arbitration. Congress should think twice
before forcing workers and companies into using a system they seldom use
voluntarily.
Parts of this report were adapted from the Mackinac Center Policy Brief
"Proposal 3: Establishing a Constitutional Requirement Extending Mandatory Collective Bargaining and Binding Arbitration to State Government Employees."
#####
Paul Kersey is senior labor policy
analyst at the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, a research and educational
institute headquartered in Midland, Mich. Permission to reprint in whole or in
part is hereby granted, provided that the author and the Center are properly
cited.