A. Is the "Florida Solution" a Workable Answer to the Problems of the Unified Bar?

Should a significant number of dissenters challenge a position of the Bar on such an issue, the Bar would be forced to continue to refund dues to large numbers of its members.

On the surface, the "Florida Solution" adopted by the Michigan State Bar solves the dilemma posed by Keller. On closer inspection, however, the "Florida solution" strips the Michigan State Bar of the ability to undertake many activities performed by voluntary bars in other states, yet does little to resolve the problems posed by Keller.

The first problem with the Florida solution is that it shifts the locus of, but does not eliminate, questions over the political activities of the bar and the rights of dissenting members. The Michigan Supreme Court order under which the Michigan State Bar now operates purports to limit the Bar's legislative activity to activities "reasonably related to" five different areas:

  1. "The regulation and discipline of attorneys;"

  2. "matters relating to the improvement of the functioning of the courts, judicial ethics, and efficiency;"

  3. "Increasing the availability of legal services to society;"

  4. "Regulation of attorney trust accounts;" and

  5. "The education, ethics, competence, integrity and regulation of the legal profession." Additionally, compulsory dues may be used to provide "content neutral" assistance to legislators .56

The problem is that none of these terms are self-defining. It may be easy, for example, to say that under the above rule, the Michigan State Bar may not take a stand, pro or con, on proposed rent control legislation. However, suppose that the State Bar adopted a position supporting a proposal to provide free legal representation to tenants in eviction proceedings or other landlord-tenant disputes. On the surface, this would clearly fall within the third criterion listed above, "increasing the availability of legal services."

Yet such a position may be staunchly opposed by many Bar members. Some would argue that it would encourage marginal or frivolous suits by tenants and thus raise the overall cost of housing to poor people. Others may simply object that this is a wasteful and inefficient use of societal resources, because the added legal services may provide less benefit to society than spending the money on a different program, or simply reducing spending.57

For the purpose of this report, the merits of any particular proposal are inconsequential. The point is that taking a position on such an issue would surely create an ideological debate every bit as real as the Bar taking a position on rent control. The fact that the issue is arguably related to expanding the availability of legal services hardly responds to the complaints of dissenting members that they are being forced to subsidize ideological or commercial activities with which they disagree.

In fact, this is exactly what has happened in Florida. Although the Florida Bar theoreti-cally engages in no Keller prohibited lobbying, it still maintains a dues rebate procedure through which members can challenge activities of the Bar as falling outside the bounds of Keller permissible activity. In practice, the Florida Bar does not contest any request from a dissenting member for a dues rebate, preferring to concede and make a partial dues refund rather than to become bogged down in endless arbitrations over its admittedly truncated legislative program.

To date, the number of objectors in Florida has been relatively small, with a total of 44 members objecting to Florida Bar positions between September 1, 1992, and August 31, 1993.58 This small number would seem to reflect the fact that the Florida Bar takes relatively few public positions, so as to comply with its restrictions on lobbying; the rather paltry size of the rebate ($8.52 plus interest in 1993), and the fact that the objector must request a rebate, in writing, within 45 days of the publication of the Bar's position. Presumably Michigan, too, will have far fewer deductions under the new scheme than it has had for the past three years, but the need for a rebate procedure, and the possibility of further litigation, will not go away.

Indeed, whether or not the number of challenges in Michigan would begin or remain small will undoubtedly depend on many factors, the most important being the extent to which the Michigan State Bar refrains from taking positions, and the determination of dissenters from State Bar positions to stand their ground.

For example, during the 1991-92 session of the Michigan legislature, the Michigan State Bar took positions on 58 pieces of legislation.59 If the current rule had been in place for that session, the Bar would have acted on far fewer issues.

However, even under the new rule, one issue that would probably have been deemed a permissible target of lobbying would have been H.B. 6029, a proposal to adopt the so-called "English Rule" of requiring the losing party in a civil lawsuit to pay the winning party's legal fees .60 The Bar could justify involvement in the matter under the rubric of expanding the availability of legal services, and possibly as a matter pertaining to the efficiency of the courts and the integrity of the profession. Nevertheless, any position taken by the Bar on this issue--pro or con--could surely be legitimately challenged as being beyond the boundaries of Keller.

Adoption of the "English Rule" was a favorite notion of former Vice President Dan Quayle and has been hotly debated not only in legal journals, but also on various editorial pages. Should a significant number of dissenters challenge a position of the Bar on such an issue, the Bar would be forced to continue to refund dues to large numbers of its members, or to engage in an expensive arbitration-possibly followed by further litigation-which it might very well lose.

Indeed, it is hard to imagine any issue that might not be challenged by dissenting members of the bar. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 allows a plaintiff to dismiss a civil lawsuit without prejudice to reinstituting the suit in the future only if done prior to the Defendant filing an answer, which must normally be done within 20 days of the filing of the complaint. Some state court systems, however, allow a plaintiff to dismiss a suit without prejudice virtually until the time of trial. Reform of a state rule to match the federal rule would seem to be precisely the type of narrow, technical issue on which the bar could expend mandatory dues to lobby. Surely it would seem to fall within "improving the efficiency of the courts." Even this issue, however, would be highly political, because the federal standard is generally viewed as being more favorable to defendants, and the state standard more favorable to plaintiffs.

Similarly, the opening for providing the legislature with "content neutral" advice on legislation also provides no safe harbor for Bar lobbying. Any actual conclusion on the merits of legislation, for example, would be prohibited unless the legislation could be fit into one of the five categories left open for Bar lobbying. As we have just seen, this task is more complicated than it at first appears.

Even a supposedly neutral listing of "advantages" and "disadvantages" of legislation would be likely to be challenged by members who view the Bar's analysis as one-sided, rather than truly "neutral." In the end, the Bar would be able to do little more than point out technical errors of draftsmanship—for example, incorrect citations to other affected portions of the Michigan Compiled Laws, or failure to specify available remedies. Whether this service is much needed, in light of the legislative staff already available to lawmakers, is debatable.

Thus, though a position taken by the Bar might seem to fit with the permissible scope of lobbying activity, the Bar could not rest easy. Although the Supreme Court in Keller found that no dues rebate was needed for lobbying on matters related to improving the quality of justice, logically it is hard to see why a person should be compelled to fund an association's propagation of views. with which she or he disagrees, merely because these views relate in some way to the quality of justice and the person happens to be a lawyer. As we have seen, apparently benign proposals often involve significant philosophical disputes over the role of states in our federal system of government, differing attitudes towards various types of business activity, or divergent beliefs about the economic effects and social wisdom of encouraging or discouraging different types of claims.

Faced with a specific case involving such a "technical" issue, it would require no significant stretch for the Supreme Court to expand upon Keller and hold that all lobbying is impermissible if undertaken with compulsory dues. A minority determined to test the full extent of its rights could drag the bar into endless arbitration and litigation over virtually every piece of legislation supported or opposed by the Bar.

The cost to the compulsory bar of gaining the rather illusory advantages offered by the Florida solution is the abandonment of much of the legislative field on which their colleagues in voluntary bar states remain eligible to play. On the one hand, we have seen that restricting lobbying activities to "non-ideological" matters offers no safe harbor from dissident challenges. At the same time, the restricted subjects of permissible lobbying clearly force the Bar to remain silent on issues that significantly affect its members, and on which its members might reasonably be expected to offer particular knowledge or expertise to the public.

For example, under the Florida Solution, the Bar will no longer be able to lobby on tort reform, even if a substantial majority of its members favor a particular position on proposed legislation.61 The organized bar will also have to remain silent on issues such as national health care reform, despite the tremendous impact which reform is expected to have on the profession.62

Above all else, the Florida solution will not allow the compulsory bar to escape the fundamental controversy which has dogged it for at least two decades--the conscription of thousands of lawyers who do not want to be members.

B. The Voluntary Alternative

The advantages of coercive membership in a state bar have always been more rhetorical than real. In his comprehensive 1983 study of unified bars, Professor Theodore Schneyer was unable to find any tangible advantage to a compulsory bar. Although it was often possible to find isolated examples to the contrary, as a whole Schneyer found that com-pulsory bar associations lagged behind voluntary bars in providing member benefits and continuing legal education programs. States with compulsory bars have generally been slower to adopt regulatory programs beneficial to consumers, such as client security funds, than voluntary bar states. Compulsory bars have never demonstrated an edge over voluntary bars in providing pro bono legal services or in increasing the availability of legal services. Schneyer similarly found no connection between compulsory bars and the ethical codes adopted by the various states, nor between the compulsory bar and attorney discipline.63

The ten years since Schneyer's study have produced no new studies favoring the compulsory bar on any of these fronts. Although supporters of the compulsory bar frequently make conclusive statements about the benefits of compulsory membership, no commentator has found empirical evidence to suggest that compulsory bars are more successful than their voluntary counterparts in any of the above referenced areas of activity.

Despite the lack of evidence to support their assertions, compulsory bar supporters nonetheless continue to argue for the necessity of a compulsory bar to carry out various missions. In fact, there are simple, logical reasons why these assertions remain unsupported by real world evidence.

Consider, for example, the common justification that a compulsory bar is necessary to assure attorney competence and discipline. Under the new Michigan State Bar dues structure, lawyers will pay $90 per year to the State Bar to fund attorney discipline.64 In Ohio, a voluntary bar state, attorneys pay just $50 per year—to the Ohio Supreme Court—to fund grievance and disciplinary activities. There is simply no reason that these functions must be done through a compulsory bar association, and, in voluntary bar states such as Ohio, they are done by state agencies.

There are, however, public policy reasons to prefer that the discipline of attorneys should not be in the hands of the state bar, not the least of which is the temptation for private groups vested with such power to use that authority to stifle competition or dissent.65 In any event, the Michigan State Bar has been stripped of much of its substantive formal role in such regulation, and so this cannot justify continuance of a compulsory bar in Michigan.

Though the compulsory bar offers no advantage in terms of regulation, an alternative justification sometimes offered in defense of the compulsory bar is that the compulsory bar has programmatic advantages over voluntary bars. The argument is simple—the added resources of coerced dues and membership enable the bar to do more in the way of pro bono programs, legal education, and other programs to benefit lawyers or the public. Again, however, on reflection, the reasons why no commentator has been able to document any truth to this assertion are simple and straightforward.

First, coerced membership does not give the bar more access to added human capital. Lawyers who do not wish to give their time to the bar voluntarily are unlikely, and indeed perhaps less likely, to do so merely because they are forced to join. Unless states—and the courts—are willing not only to force lawyers to belong to the bar, but also to commandeer their participation in bar functions and programs, there is no net gain in human resources. In fact, the compulsory bar dissipates considerable human capital in the constant infighting between lawyers who do not want to be members of the bar association and those who want to coerce their colleagues into joining.

Still, one might assume that those members who do want to participate in bar programs will have greater financial resources owing to the coerced dues taken in from other lawyers. Leaving aside the question of what percentage of the unified bar's income is spent in accommodating and fighting with fellow lawyers seeking to exit the association, the dues issue is vastly overblown. The Michigan State Bar presently receives nearly 80% of its income in the form of member dues.66 However, most voluntary bars have developed other sources of income and have been able to lower significantly their reliance on dues. In Ohio, dues account for approximately 55% of the Ohio State Bar Association's income.67 Other voluntary bar associations have relied on dues for as little as 30% of revenue.68

Virtually all voluntary state bars boast regular membership of at least 70% of the state's lawyers, with some having greater than 90% of the state's lawyers as members. The member-ship rate in Minnesota's voluntary state bar has recently been above 90%; in Illinois it typically runs 70% or more; Indiana's voluntary membership is 87%; Ohio's 70%; and Wisconsin retained 85% membership when it switched from a compulsory to a voluntary bar in 1988.69

Assuming a dismal outcome in which a voluntary Michigan Bar retained only 70% of its members and continued to rely on dues for 70% of its income, the Bar would face a budget cut of approximately 20%. In a more optimistic scenario, in which the Bar garnered 80% participation and reduced its reliance on dues to 50% of income, the budget would be cut by less than 10%. Of course, the Bar would also no longer have to provide benefits to coerced members who would prefer not to have them, thus reducing some costs.

Certainly the Bar could survive with a 10% to 20% reduction in income. While the Michigan State Bar has approximately 671 members per staff person, Indiana has approximately 909 members for each state bar staffer, and Ohio approximately 954 members for each staffer.70

Furthermore, Schneyer found substantial evidence that voluntary bar associations were actually better able than compulsory bars to raise money and usually had higher levels of per member funding than mandatory bar states. Schneyer hypothesized that this may be due to resistance to dues increases, in compulsory bars, by those members who would prefer not to be members of the compulsory bar at all.71 However, it may also be due to the different nature of the payment of dues. Where dues are mandatory, lawyers may view the bar as a taxing authority, to which no more than necessary need be paid.

Lawyers, generally an individualistic lot, may be more willing to support an increase in fees to their professional organization than to a perceived taxing authority. In a voluntary bar, members must think about the value of membership and their own commitment to the profession. Thus, the Ohio bar has been successful in convincing many members to pay an amount far in excess of regular dues to become "sustaining members," a title with nothing more than honorary significance. Ohio lawyers pay between $60 and $225 extra per year in dues for this designation.

Even if involuntary dues income does increase the resources available to a compulsory bar, there is no evidence that these resources translate into added benefits for the public or bar association members. Like its Michigan counterpart, for example, the voluntary Ohio State Bar Association provides its members with access to insurance, discounts, continuing legal education programs, and a regular magazine-type publication. Additionally, Ohio lawyer members receive a weekly magazine with updates on legislation and the full text of newly reported court opinions—a service no mandatory bar in the country provides. The Ohio State Bar carries on an active legislative program and programs to mentor young lawyers. It assists lawyers with ethical or substance abuse problems and sponsors numerous public education programs. The Ohio State Bar is able to do this despite a relatively low member-ship rate—compared to other voluntary bar states—of approximately 70% of the state's attorneys.

In the field of pro bono legal services, there is no suggestion that legal services for the poor and indigent are more readily available in Michigan than in Ohio or the other voluntary bar states surrounding Michigan. In Ohio and many other voluntary states, local bar associations are particularly active in providing pro bono legal services. It is generally conceded that forcing all lawyers to belong to the state bar inhibits the development of voluntary, local bar associations. It seems likely that by hurting enrollment in local bar associations, a compulsory bar stymies local pro bono efforts. The provision of legal services is done locally, and local needs differ greatly from place to place. Again, the compulsory nature of dues in a unified bar may make even non-dissident members view their dues as a tax, relieving them of pro bono responsibility. Thus, a unified bar may actually stifle pro bono activity.

Whatever the reasons, as Schneyer found 10 years ago, there is simply no tangible, programmatic advantage to a unified bar.

Lacking meaningful evidence of any programmatic benefits to unification, compulsory bar supporters often argue that there are non-programmatic advantages to the compulsory bar that justify its existence even if it provides no tangible programming benefits. Here, too, such advantages seem illusory, at best.

One claimed advantage is that a compulsory bar allows the profession to speak with one voice. In light of the ongoing lawsuits brought by dissident members over unified bar political activity, this argument may turn reality on its head. The unified bar, in fact, exacerbates the tensions within the profession and makes the level of membership support for every position asserted by the bar suspect. Where members cannot "vote with their feet," it is always difficult for lawmakers or the public to know the true level of support.

At the same time, a compulsory bar, since Keller, can exaggerate the degree of dissension within the profession by assuring a fractured voice. This occurs because, under a compulsory bar, a dissident attorney can request a dues deduction at no cost. If the member disagrees with any position of the bar strongly enough, he or she can collect a rebate, even if he or she agrees with a majority of the positions of the bar. The dissident attorney need not give up benefits of bar membership, nor the right to try to shape bar policy on other issues of concern.

In contrast, under a voluntary system, an attorney who disagrees with a bar association position must either pay the full dues or leave the association entirely, thereby forfeiting member benefits and the opportunity to engage in further policy discussions on the issue in question or on other issues. This gives members a strong incentive not to drop out merely because they disagree with a few, or even all, positions taken by the bar. In this respect, the voluntary bar forces lawyers to concentrate energies on common interests, not disagreements, and presents the public with a confident, unified voice, rather than one hoping that its dissidents won't create too big a scene if it chooses to speak on an issue.

It is also suggested that a mandatory bar is necessary to assure that all lawyers are steeped in the tradition of the law and that their sense of professionalism is carefully nurtured through-out their careers—presumably through forced association with bar activists who represent the highest standards of the profession. Even beyond the self-congratulatory nature of the argument, this view borders on the specious. How, one might ask, can one expect lawyers happily to find professionalism by being conscripted into an organization they would prefer not to join? Resentment of the profession's norms, as determined by the bar, seems the more logical result. Furthermore, the compulsory bar still cannot force enthusiastic participation, but only sullen, involuntary association. Unless we are prepared to force lawyers not just to join, but to participate actively in the bar, nothing is gained by mandatory membership.

Furthermore, the argument is based on a flawed perception of reality. Virtually all lawyers in the United States, and all lawyers seeking to practice in Michigan, must first pass through the unifying experience of three years of law school, with a mandatory ethics component. Lawyers must then pass a bar examination and an investigation of their back-ground for character. Continuing legal education, including an ethics component, is required while in practice.72 Also, the overwhelming majority of lawyers in voluntary states belong to either their state association, a local association, or the American Bar Association. All Michigan attorneys are subject to the authority of the state supreme court and the Attorney Discipline Board. Thus we find that lawyers are, from the inception of their legal education and throughout their careers, imbued with professional norms.

No Ohio, Indiana, Minnesota, or Illinois lawyer would take seriously the assertion that a mandatory bar is necessary to promote professionalism, and it is doubtful that many Michigan lawyers, including those in favor of a compulsory bar, would feel that their own level of professionalism would be diminished if they could no longer coerce their colleagues into the association.

It is also sometimes argued that the compulsory bar assures participation of women, minorities, and rural attorneys in the bar. Once again, the argument seems to be that forced association with the bar will necessarily result in participation and a sense of inclusion. Also once again, the argument hardly seems worthy of serious consideration. In fact, it seems more likely that the opposite is true: a unified bar able to force such under-represented groups to join has little incentive to develop programs or sensitivity to the concerns of these groups. Voluntary bars must truly reach out to include such groups. The Ohio State Bar Association, for example, has recently completed a major study of women in the profession, devoting an entire issue of its members' magazine to a report of the results.73

Another supposed advantage of the mandatory bar is that it eliminates free riders, i.e., lawyers who benefit from the Bar's activities but refuse to pay for them. This it does, although it is not clear why "fairness" dictates that free riders be eliminated. If this is why a compulsory bar is necessary, all other professional associations, trade associations, labor unions and lobbying groups could make the same claim. We might, to use this logic, require all small business owners to belong to the National Federation of Independent Business, or all consumers to join the Consumers Union. We might also require all citizens to donate to the American Red Cross, as the activities of that organization benefit society generally.

The last argument commonly resorted to by defenders of Michigan's compulsory bar is not really an argument at all, but a statement of fact—many states have unified bars, and the Supreme Court has not struck down the unified bar as unconstitutional.

In Michigan, compulsory bar defenders often point to Wisconsin, a neighboring state which was unified by a state supreme court order after legislative efforts at unification had failed. After a 1988 United States District Court ruling forced Wisconsin to drop its mandatory membership requirement entirely, the Wisconsin bar functioned as a voluntary association. When Keller opened the way for reunification if dues deductions were available to dissenting members, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which had previously upheld the unified bar against frequent challenges, again conditioned the practice of law on membership in the State Bar of Wisconsin.

Though the request for a unification order came from the State Bar, Wisconsin's experience with a voluntary bar should hardly be interpreted, as Michigan State Bar officers have attempted to do, as a failure. During four years of voluntary operation, Wisconsin's bar membership remained very high, in excess of 80%.74 The bar moved much more aggressively into the provision of continuing legal education programs than it had in the past, reduced its reliance on dues income, and remained financially sound.75 There was no reported increase in disciplinary actions or ethical violations.

When the Bar's leadership considered reunification after Keller, the Association's Executive Director opposed reunification. No formal survey or vote was taken of Wisconsin lawyers. At the time, membership was running at approximately 80%, and it is fair to assume that the overwhelming majority of those who had not joined the voluntary bar opposed reunification. Thus, even if Association members had favored reunification by a 60%-40% margin, the reunification would have been opposed by a majority of the state's lawyers.

In fact, many observers believe that a majority of Wisconsin lawyers, especially younger lawyers, opposed reunification. However, the Board of Governors, which requested the order, and the Supreme Court, which issued the order, had always been on record as favoring reunification. It was, as one State Bar member and supporter of a voluntary bar stated, "always a foregone conclusion that the Board would request and the Supreme Court would order reunification."76 Interestingly, the Committee appointed by the Bar to argue for reunification did not, in its report, cite a single program or issue that had been rendered ineffective, reduced in scope, or discontinued by the move from a compulsory to a voluntary bar in 1988.77

Thus, the Wisconsin experience represents no victory for the work of the compulsory bar, any more than does the fact that the Michigan Bar is unified at the present time. Compulsory bars should be evaluated on their merits. Unless supporters can point to real benefits, the intrusion on the rights of lawyers cannot be justified. The sad fact that the Wisconsin Bar's Board of Governors and State Supreme Court were eager to return to coerced membership does not represent a victory for the effectiveness of the unified bar.

Against these non-existent benefits must be juxtaposed tangible disadvantages to the unified bar. By opting for the Florida solution, the Michigan bar may have taken a step necessary to its ongoing viability as a unified bar, but one which gives it far less of a role in public affairs than it would have had it chosen to become a non-coercive association.

In the wake of Keller, there are public disadvantages to the compulsory bar as well. Under the public agency model, the bar would operate under heavy state control, an option which is unsatisfactory to most attorneys and would probably result in the creation of a voluntary bar operating alongside the mandatory bar.78

In the labor union model of the unified bar adopted by the Supreme Court in Keller, state oversight of the bar is lessened, but is conducted less for the broader public good than to protect the rights of dissenting lawyers trapped in the compulsory bar. In a voluntary bar state, on the other hand, the state can directly assume the regulatory functions properly conducted by the state rather than by a private organization, and regulate these issues in the public interest while leaving lawyers to tend to the broader issues of professionalism and to pro bono, educational, and other programs. Thus the compulsory bar is less likely to serve the public interest than the voluntary bar, in which lines of demarcation between state authority and private action are more clear and the state need not intervene in the private operations of the organization except if necessary to further some higher public good.

Moreover, as we have seen, the Florida solution is not likely to stop the ongoing infighting over the bar's activities and the compulsory membership of unwilling attorneys. The Michigan State Bar will be required to face regular arbitrations against its own members or continue to refund dues to any lawyer making such a request.

Lawyers who object to the State Bar's advocacy of positions with which they disagree will are unlikely to be mollified by a dues deduction that will almost certainly fall below $10. It seems clear that the crux of dissenting lawyers' complaints comes not from the dollar support which they must give to positions they oppose, but from a more deeply rooted sense of being forcibly linked with positions of the State Bar through compulsory membership.79

The compulsory bar has generally responded to this complaint by arguing that dissenting members remain free to express their views individually, and the public does not presume that all members agree with the bar's official position.80 Surely this response misses the point. The fact is that lawyers are compelled to associate with those with whom they would prefer not to associate and linked in the minds of many to views they do not espouse.

No one would seriously suggest that if lawyers were forced to join the Ku Klux Klan as a condition of practice, their concerns would be mollified because they could individually dissent from Klan positions. Conceding that the Michigan State Bar is a less odious group than the Ku Klux Klan does not change the sense of invasion felt by those who would prefer not to link themselves to the State Bar. Thus, the compulsory bar will almost certainly remain a source of controversy and division within the legal profession.

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56 Mi SCt Admin Order 1993-5 (July 30, 1993).

57 See Jonathan R. Macy, Not All Pro Bono Work Helps the Poor, The Wall St J, December 30, 1992 at A7.

58 Confidential memorandum from Paul F. Hill, General Counsel to the Florida Bar, to the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar, dated Sep. 1, 1993.

59 Legislative Report, Mich. B J, Feb. 1993 at 242.

60 In fact, Michael Karwoski, Assistant Executive Director for Programs and Governmental Relations of the Michigan State Bar, has indicated his opinion that H.B. 6029 could be lobbied under the new rule. Letter from M. Karwoski to Bradley A. Smith, July 19, 1993. It should be noted that this is a personal opinion and does not mean that the Bar would still have taken a position on this issue, or that the Bar's Board of Commissioners or Representative Assembly would have agreed that it was a permissible subject of lobby-ing. However, the very fact that such disagreement might exist exposes the difficulty of implementing the Bar's new approach.

61 McBrien, supra n. 35 (quoting Michigan State Bar Communications Director Thomas C. Oren.)

62 Rorie Sherman, Health Plan to Have Major Legal Impact, Nat L J, Sep. 20, 1993 at 1.

63 Schneyer, supra n. I at 96-106.

64 Marcia McBrien, Keller and Bar Dues Proposals Approved by High Court, Mich. L. W., Aug. 9, 1993.

65 See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan L Rev 1 (1981); Gelhorn, the Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U Chi L Rev 6 (1976).

66 State Bar of Michigan Statement of Revenues and Expenses, Mich B J, June 1993 at 618.

67 Dennis L. Ramey, Association Expands Member Services and Non-Dues Income, Ohio Lawyer, May-June 1993 at 4.

68 See, e.g. Patricia Heim, The Case for a Voluntary Bar, Wis. Law., Feb. 1991 at 10. This was a slight decrease in the percentage of income from dues than in 1988, when membership was mandatory. 1988 Annual Report of the State Bar of Wisconsin, Wis B Bul, Nov. 1988, at 35.

69 For a general, somewhat dated look at membership rates in voluntary state bar associations, see Schneyer, supra n. 1 at 10. The Illinois estimate is from Schneyer, while the Ohio figure was reported in a phone call with the author by Kate Hagan of the Ohio State Bar Association as of June 30, 1993. The Indiana figure is from Marcia M. McBrien, Will Keller Spell End for an Integrated Michigan Bar?, Mich L W Mar. 22, 1993. Wisconsin's figure appeared John Walsh, Looking to the Future, Wis B Bul, Dec. 1988, at 57. Minnesota's figure is from Irvine Charne, The Case for a Mandatory Bar, Wis Law, Feb. 1991, at 10.

70 Denny L. Ramey, Comparatively Speaking, Ohio Law, Jan./Feb. 1990, at 4. Michigan is not particularly fat as state bar associations go-it has a higher ratio of members to staff than does Wisconsin's mandatory bar, or the voluntary bars of Minnesota and Illinois. Id.

71 Schneyer, supra, n. 1 at 14-15.

72 ABA Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum, 95-112 (R. MacCrate, ed., West Pub. 1993) (1992).

73 Ohio Lawyer, July/Aug. 1993. The Association has recently installed its first female president, Kathy Burke.

74 Walsh, supra n. 55.

75 Heim, supra n. 54.

76 Patricia Heim, Chair of the Special Committee to Recommend a Voluntary Bar, in a phone conference with Bradley A. Smith, Sep. 23, 1993.

77 Charne, supra n. 55. It is interesting to compare the Committee's report to the predictions made by unified bar supporters immediately after the court decision that temporarily abol-ished the compulsory bar. See Ron McCrea, Bar at Crossroads: Mandatory or Voluntary, Wis B Bul, July 1988 at 11. The fears expressed at that time-huge membership losses, massive dues increases, mass drop-outs of minorities, women and small town lawyers, and sparsely attended programs-do not seem to have come about, but the committee called for reunification anyway, offering conclusive statements about the benefits of unification.

78 This is exactly what occurred in Louisiana when Huey Long created a unified bar as a true public agency. See n. 7 supra, and accompanying text.

79 Schneyer, supra n. 1 at 83, citing Wes Smith, Shootout at the unified Bars, B Leader, Nov.-Dec. 1978 at 11 (District of Columbia bar members objecting to the District's compulsory bar filing an amicus brief in anti-trust litigation received a dues rebate of 15 cents.)

80 See Franck, supra n. 1; Falk 1 at 233 (Opinion of Williams, J.); In re Unification of N.H. Bar, 248 A2d 709, 713 (N.H. 2968).